THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Hidayet Sıddıkoğlu
Hiroshima University
Doktora Öğrencisi

Abstract
The sudden demise of Cold War politics ended the possibility of nuclear war to international security. In the absence of macro-level threats to international security, scholars, analysts and policy-makers hastily searched for new threats to fill this gap. In this context issues such as pandemics, violations of human rights and democratisation have become important subjects amongst Western policy makers and analysts of international security studies. However, in the world outside the Western orbit, issues of geopolitics have retained their de facto importance in international security and have grown even stronger in some regions, such as Middle East, South and East Asia. This article examines the role of state based on three key challenges of international security, geopolitics, non-traditional threats, and human rights. It will be argued that in spite of the fact that critical schools of thought, advocating importance of non-state actors to international security, have gained recognition in the post-Cold War era; states remain crucial and responsible actors in international security.

Keywords: State, International Security, Geopolitics, Non-State Organisations, Proxy Warfare

Öz

Anahtar Sözcüklər: Devlet, Uluslararası Güvenlik, Jeopolitik, Devlet-Dışı Örgütler, Vekalet Savaşımı

* Makale geliş tarihi: 23.01.2015
Makale kabul tarihi: 24.05.2016
The Role of the State in International Security since the End of the Cold War

Today, it is becoming increasingly apparent that whether Russian annexation of Crimea, Chinese geopolitical and strategic assertions in South East Asia, India-Pakistan rising geopolitical tensions in South Asia or most importantly the start of a new Cold War in Syria, the issues surrounding the contemporary international security are crystalized around or through states. Although, elements on ground, particularly since the September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States (US), camouflages as non-state actors manoeuvre greater power in international security, indeed, states are deeply entrenched in the contemporary security challenges at both domestic and international levels. In fact, this is not unprecedented; throughout history, states have been controlling commanding heights as important institutions to determine security at individual and national or international levels. However, states have not followed a linear path in their role in international security. In fact, they have been subject to dramatic changes. For instance, they had taken confrontational steps to expand territories of their governance throughout the colonial epoch whereas during the Cold War era they had sought for the security alignments or security cooperation with Eastern or Western blocs. Nevertheless, today, after the failure of inter-governmental institutions – here what this article takes the inter-governmental institutions to be are such as United Nations (UN) in particular UN Security Council (UNSC), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU) – to bring off collective security tasks, states have remained as self-seeking institutions that look after their security needs (economic, military, socio-cultural) individually.

This article is not an attempt to add up another assessment in past discussions articulating the importance of state in international security or vice versa. Neither, it lines up with pros or cons to traditional International Security Studies (ISS) or oppositional critical thoughts. Significantly, with reference to at least three key areas of security studies: geopolitics, non-traditional threats, and securing human rights, this article discusses the extent to which it demonstrates the potential role of states as dominant actors in international security since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the international security could not otherwise be explained by analysing other factors such as non-state actors as well as non-traditional threats to international security. This does not at all mean that non-state actors such as Islamic terrorist organisations, Al-Qaeda, or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are not important variables that can be used to explain the contemporary challenges of international
security. Additionally, this is also not to say that the state is the sole actor in international security. In contrast, this paper acknowledges the fact that it is not always states that shape international security. Significantly, non-state regional and international actors are essential components of international security. Particularly, since the end of the Cold War, the non-state actors have started to participate and propose security agendas in international security meetings with states and UN bodies (Weiss and Zach, 2013: 383). However, the argument presented here is that the non-state institutions do not always succeed as decisive and responsible actors when it comes to tackling threats posed to international security. In the contemporary world, states continue as important actors at both domestic and international levels when it comes to taking decisions against any threat to security. Consequently, states dominate circumstances that determine security at all levels. To summarise, this article argues that no matter how the contemporary ISS is incorporated with environmental, economic, human, gender and other securities that sit alongside the traditional security studies, states not only depict conditions that determine security at all levels, but also continue to preserve their de facto importance in international security since the end of the Cold War.

This article will be divided into four parts. The first part will discuss the past discussions and theories in the context of role of the state in international security since the end of the Cold War. The second part will deal with geopolitics and the way in which non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have become multi-dimensional, unrestrained, variables playing a significant role in the security strategies of other states. Specifically, the protracted geopolitical issues between India and Pakistan in South Asia, non-state proxy warfare in Syria and the Ukraine crisis in Eastern Europe will be discussed. In part three, the roles of both state and non-state actors in response to non-traditional threats, pandemic to international security, will be examined. It will be argued that in spite of salient efforts by regional and international inter-governmental and non-state actors, including UN agencies and NGOs, it is the state that holds the responsible authority and power to tackle non-traditional threats to international security. In part four, the roles of both state and non-state actors’ in securing human rights will be examined, and the question of who is responsible for securing human rights will be addressed. In this context, it will be argued that both state and non-state organisations, including UN organisations, are interconnected, responsible elements for securing human rights. The argument in this part will be structured around an examination of the case of Rwandan genocide and an attempt to account for how the UN and the Rwandan state failed to protect Rwandan citizens from crimes of ethnic cleansing.
1. The Past Discussions

The past discussions on the role of state in international security not only have developed empirical assessments, but also have measured up considerable amount of theoretical analysis. The analysis and theories that have gained considerable recognition and markedly amplified not only in the field of international security, but also in strategic studies since the end of the Cold War were those that criticised the traditional theory of ISS. The first critical theories developed against the traditional security studies were mainly if not in general in line with Barry Buzan’s critiques in which he considered the traditional realist domination in ISS in the post-Cold War era as “problematic” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 187). However, the oppositional thought has not developed in linear and monolithic form, rather it has evolved as multi-layered streams – critical security studies, Copenhagen school, feminism, structuralism, and peace studies – that incorporated other factors such as economic, environmental, humanitarianism and structural violence alongside traditional security discourse of ISS. In this context, the earliest academic criticism of traditional ISS emerged in May 1994, during a conference entitled “Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approach to Security” held in York University, Toronto. The presentations from this conference were later developed into a book edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams; Critical Security Studies: Concept and Cases (Mutimer, 2013: 69). In this book, scholars from various academic backgrounds analysed and criticised traditional security studies, emphasising different issues from different perspectives, such as gender, economy, globalisation, and human security. Consequently, these scholars advocated alternative concepts and theories of international security studies. Hence, there is no unanimously agreed single theory encompassing international security studies. According to Mutimer (2013: 68), critics of the traditional approach do not signify lucid and clear-cut outlooks to international security. The term critical security study in this context refers to heterogeneous and analogous analyses, concepts that discourse a range of theoretical agendas (Krause and Williams, 1997: viii).

As a result, since the end of the Cold War, the term security has evolved into a multi-dimensional flexible concept that covers all aspects of human life (social, economic, political, cultural, religious and military). Significantly, critics of ISS challenged the epistemological and ontological perceptions of traditional security studies. Some like Dalby described the post-Cold War security as elastic concept that does not necessarily tie-up with conventional understanding (Dalby, 1997: 6). Similarly, for Krause and Williams (1997: ix), “security is a derivative concept; it is in itself meaningless… [and] it cannot be self-referential”. However, for some scholars, such as Paul Williams, security depends upon threat agendas constructed by different people, hence, the
perceptions people have of security challenges and priorities will differ according to their geographic, economic, political, religious and cultural circumstances. Accordingly, for the Western world, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are considered to be priority threats to international security, whereas for developing countries the priority threats are socio-economic challenges and intra-state conflicts (Williams, 2013: 9). Indeed, this concept is clearly defined by Zedner, who stated that “[se]curity varies in its importance; in its location between states, private, and civil society…and in its very meaning” (Zedner, 2009: 11). In the same way, it is equally important to identify that security is always incorporated with particular referent object, hence not all threat agendas as well as not all groups, are of equal political importance (William, 2013: 9). For some scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob the notions, theories, and criticisms of ISS are all Western phenomenon. Thus, theories and practices developed in these contexts have failed to recognise the importance of the “Third World” (non-western, non-industrialised developing nations), which forms the majority in the international system, where states are dominated by what Ayoob calls “subaltern realism” and where, most importantly, the majority of inter-state or intrastate conflicts have occurred since the end of the World War II (Ayoob, 1997: 122-124).

Given the role of powerful states in shaping international security, scholars have stated that the “architectonic impulse of the American polity and, subsequently, of its allies...security elsewhere is ...recent” (Dalby, 1997: 19-21). Significantly, all scholars of international relations, international politics, and security may agree that international relations, international politics, and international security have been dominated by Western powers since the emergence of Westphalia. As a result, the majority of the Western born theories such as globalisation, economic integrity, and alliance may have been applicable in the Western world. Nonetheless, the non-Western developing world empirically and theoretically fall outside the orbit of Western born theories that discourse range of concepts and critiques on economic integrity, political and security alliance, free movements of goods and people (globalisation), human rights, freedom of speech, women rights – based on Western principles and values. Conversely, what occupies dominant place in the Third World is dictatorship, inequality – particularly gender – violation of human rights, structural violence, ethnicity, economic and military power competitions, religious sectarianism, and geopolitics. Significantly, this does not exclude the Third World from the Western dominated international system. In other words, some of the ills that the Third World faces today can be traced back to the Western imperialism that dominated international system since the emergence of the Westphalia in 17th century.
Some of the main criticisms aimed towards the conventional security studies, which gained recognition amongst scholars of ISS, were proposed by scholars such as Ken Booth, who advocated emancipation theory, the “freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Booth, 1991: 319). Similarly, Krause and Williams (1997) questioned the epistemological understanding of traditional security studies by questioning whose security it is and for whom. Likewise other scholars, Agius and McDonald stated that identity, non-material ideational factors and culture play a central role in international security (Agius, 2013: 87-89; McDonald, 2013: 64-65). Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in their book, *The Evaluation of International Security Studies*, conceptualises the post-Cold War security studies through three concepts; first, the narrow complementary principle such as strategy, deterrence, or humanitarianism; second, the broader concept of parallel theory that articulates security into a political theory – under an international framework; and third, the critical theory that advocates security in the framework of widening approach (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 14). In sum, it can be said that the most prominent advocates were those who proclaimed individuals the true referents of security, not the state, and sought a core agenda of peace in promoting democracy, human rights, individual freedom and power, privatisation, and human security. This agenda has shaped the centre of diplomacy in the Western states since the end of the Cold War.

**Geopolitics: the Rise of new Strategies**

Whether it is Russian forces seizing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters, Japan responding with an increasingly assertive strategy of its own, or Iran trying to use its alliance with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations (Mead, 2014: 69).

The term “geopolitics” in this paper refers to “great power rivalries and the geographical dimension of global political power” (Dalby, 2010: 50). The foreign policies of states around the world are preoccupied with geopolitical issues, particularly those related to economic and political hegemony, such as control over resource-rich territories like the Middle East. The national interests of states concern regions across international borders. For example, the oil-rich Gulf States are a concern of national interest for the US and Western states.

On 29 January 1991, before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, President George H. W. Bush of the United States said that “diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal
aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom and rule of law” (Bush, 1991). This may have been true for the Western world, but not for the rest. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the triumph of liberal democracy, privatisation, and free trade was celebrated in the Western world. However, for much of the rest of the world, the meaning of the new world order was different. States in many parts of the developing world were preoccupied by a number of geopolitical issues. The security concerns of each state were riddled with challenges. In order to provide a pragmatic example of the rise of new strategies in contemporary geopolitics, this paper selects regions and cases that have been playing an important role in the contemporary world of politics and security (for example, the conflict between Pakistan and India in South Asia; the rise of new conflicts in the Middle East (the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria); the rise of China as a political and economic power and the balance of power in the region; the provocative Russian strategy towards the Ukraine and the crisis in Europe).

1.1. South Asia

In the context of South Asia, the overall security of the region is directly linked to the geopolitical issues between India and Pakistan. The two states, from the outset of the partition (the division of the Indian subcontinent into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India) have been in continuous warfare, primarily over the disputed region of Kashmir. Since their independence, the two countries have officially gone to war several times, in 1947, 1965, and in 1971 (Sheikh et al., 2012; Mirza, 2014: 8).

Pakistan, the traditional rival, has proactively used its proxy forces to contain India’s hegemony in the region. Both of the states are engaged in what Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 20) calls “relative gains”, particularly in terms of the arms race, which refers to the states’ competition for the dominant role in security in South Asia. Moreover, given the fact that both states are nuclear powers, these concerns are causes for alarm in international security.

The old proxies of the Eastern and Western blocs have been updated in sophisticated ways to serve the proxies of regional states. Pakistan has supported a range of non-state terrorist organisations, such as Harakatul Mujahedin (Movement of Mujahedin, Islamic) and Lashkar-e Taiba (Soldiers of Purity) who were active in Kashmir and India (Maley, 2009; Rizvi, 2004; Gartenstein-Ross, 2010). In order to contain the Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan maintains a policy of “strategic depth” on Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk, 2012: 9). Reciprocally, India has remained involved in the insecure regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan (Sheikh et al., 2012; Mirza, 2014).
In the context of proxy warfare, Afghanistan once again plays its traditional role of buffer zone for the secret wars between India and Pakistan, as it did during colonial era between Tsarist Russia and the British East India Company and during the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. At the 18th Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, at a meeting with the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan, said, “we will not permit anybody to conduct proxy wars on our soil” (Aljazeera, 2014).

According to Buzan and Hansen (2009: 179), “South Asia been substantially covered in the discussions of great power politics and nuclear proliferation”. Preoccupied by geostrategic and geopolitical diplomacy, both India and Pakistan are in a continuous arms race. India has recently successfully tested a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, Agni-II (Times of India, 2014a), and in response to this, Pakistan has also successfully tested nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, with a range of 900 kilometres (Times of India, 2014b). Under the high tensions of geopolitics, both states allocate large sums of their national incomes to defence expenditures (Anwar et al., 2012). This allocation of a large portion of the national budgets to the arms race has stagnated the social and public welfare sectors and burdened already deficient human development achievements in both the state of Pakistan, which ranks 146 out of 187 countries on the human development index, and India, which ranks 136 out of 187 (Human Development Report, 2013).

UN agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Oxfam, and many other regional and international non-state organisations, are actively playing a role in supporting both countries on a series of issues ranging from climate change, natural disaster, gender inequalities, economic underdevelopment, human rights, women’s rights, and other human development programmes. However, none of the international or regional non-state organisations, including the SAARC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), have been able to play an effective role in downgrading the geopolitical stalemate between India and Pakistan. Most importantly, neither of these nuclear power states is a signatory on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has failed to encourage either state to sign this treaty, and the two countries play important roles in the proxy warfare that is destabilising security within the region and beyond. As nuclear power states, both India and Pakistan play inevitable roles in international security.
1.2. The Middle East

Throughout history Middle East has continuously preserved its geopolitical importance in international security and politics. From the onset of Palestine-Israel war in 1940s to the current crisis in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East remains an important region for non-state asymmetrical warfare. However, traditionally this was limited to specific ideas and goals such as creation of an independent state of Palestine. Moreover, both the Eastern and Western blocs used non-state groups as tools to exert geopolitical interests during the Cold War period. However, since the end of the Cold War, particularly post 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, religion in particular Islam took over the cockpit in the non-state warfare. This happened mostly in the regions where states were preoccupied with the issues of ethnicity, religious sectarianism and tribalism. Moreover, given the fact that most of the Middle Eastern countries share ethnic, cultural and religious values, the security concerns of one state can easily penetrate states across borders. This has taken place in various ways. Strategically, states used various non-state actors in whatever form they deemed functional to yield their desired interests. According to Lobel and Mauceri (2004: 5) “neighbouring kin will intervene through IGOs, NGOs … support can take many forms… encouragement to covert training, arm supply and financing of armed groups.” As a result, mass of diverse actors – state and non-state – engaged in modern warfare that made the contemporary wars long-lasting enduring violence with no prospect of peace in the region (Münkler, 2012: 193).

As a result of whether kinship policy, geostrategic, political or economic interests of neighbouring states and international powers, the nature of once considered to be a peaceful protest against the President Bashar Al Asad’s authoritarian regime, under the notion of Arab Spring, has changed into a proxy warfare between different regional and international powers. Although none of the regional states has officially confirmed their involvement in Syrian conflict, there have been serious accusations in media reports (for example BBC and The Washington Post) about the influence of regional states such as Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Hezbollah of Lebanon, on Syrian conflict (Ignatius, 2014; Muir, 2013). In their article in The Washington Post published on 11 September 2013, Londoño and Miller stated “while the State Department is coordinating nonlethal aid, the CIA is overseeing the delivery of weaponry and other lethal equipment to the rebels.” The regional and international involvements in domestic issues of Syria have turned the country into a new safe haven for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Given the example of the role of non-state actors as independent forces, or as surrogates of states such as the West, US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Turkey and Iran in modern warfare, particularly in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria), it is apparent that states play important role in the current crisis of contemporary terrorism. Within this context, not surprisingly the ramification of Turkey’s downing of Russian jet for breaching its airspace near the Syrian-Turkish border was the sudden rise in terrorist insurgencies led by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and ISIS across the country since January 2016. However, this is not to say that states create terrorism. There are various religious, ethnic and social factors that can foster terrorism. Some scholars emphasise that inadequate provision of social services and poverty can cause for terrorism, particularly in the regions where issues of ethnicity, military power politics, religious sectarianism and geopolitics are in rise (Paizza, 2006; Muzalevsky, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Acharya, 2011; Rashid, 2012). Given the example of Syrian conflict, what is important to note is to whether Russian military intervention into Syrian civil war under a potentially legitimate Syrian government’s request (Mohseni, 2015: 1), or Turkish, Jordanian, French, US and UK’s military operations at both individual or collective levels against the ISIS in Syria and Iraq, it is the state that controls commanding heights at all levels (strategic decision making, diplomacy and military action), particularly in taking decisive actions against any issue that it deems as threat to its interest.

However, it should be noted that whether it is poverty, religious rhetoric, state failure to provide adequate social services, or state sponsored terrorism, the contemporary terrorism has entered into a new phase, where the operations of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have no specific geographic locus. For example, Al-Qaeda and ISIS are active in a number of countries in the Middle East and South Asia. At the same time, tactics of terrorism is continuously transforming alongside the technological advancement. Notably, as stated above, intra-state conflicts, radical extremism, and terrorism in the global south, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen) are spreading across international borders. In response to this kind of terrorism, states have also adopted new strategies. The states’ counter terrorism strategies ranges from developing special anti-terror forces, intelligence sharing to adopt new anti-terror legislations such as Anti-Terrorism Act in UK. However, designating non-state group a terrorist organisation is controversial between distinct states. For example, Jamaat-ud Dawa, a designated terrorist group in UN blacklist received about $1 million fund from the government of Pakistan (BBC, 2010). Similarly, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) recognised as a Syrian wings of PKK terrorist groups by Turkish state are not considered as terrorist organisation by the West including the US (Yackley, 2015). In this context, criticising the Western stance toward YPG/PYD the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that “[t]hey don’t accept the PYD as terrorist
organisation, the West still has mentality of ‘My terrorist is good, yours is bad’” (Yackley, 2015).

On the other hand, states compete for economic and military supremacy as Mearsheimer (1995: 9) explains “state strife not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieve that lofty position.” This phenomenon has led some states to use various means including non-state terrorist groups to exert their political, geostrategic, and economic interests in regional and international arenas. For example, Pakistan is accused (mainly by the US, Afghanistan, and India) of using non-state terrorist groups such as Harakatul Mujahedın, Lashkar-e Taiba and the Haqqani group as a tool to advance its national interests. This kind of phenomenon can be easily observed in the developing world. In contrast, the Western world has become truly globalised and the political, economic and security interests of states are shared under inter-governmental institutions such as the EU. Similarly to globalisation, which Waltz stated, “is not truly global, but is mainly limited to northern latitudes” (Waltz, 2000: 47), theories of post-Cold War ISS (broadening, deepening, constructivism, democratic peace, peace studies and feminism) are also not global, but rather limited to part of a globalised society, not the entire world. For example, Wendt stated that in the post-Cold War era “international politics are social rather that strictly material” and social structures in international politics are defined as “shared understanding, expectations, or knowledge… British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than … North Korean” (Wendt, 2000: 416-419). This analysis of the post-Cold War era may have been true in the developed Western world, where borders have become eroded and states are economically, socially and politically integrated. However, given the fact that in the world outside the Western (North American and Europe) orbit where issues of ethnicity, religious diversity, economic and military power competitions and geopolitics play greater role, it would be naïve to consider that states such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Russia, Lebanon and Israel can form a social structure.

Although the daunting humanitarian crisis – state killing its own citizens – in Syria has met the criterion for the UN’s Responsibility to Protect agenda since the start of the civil war, the international community in particular the UNSC has failed to prevent Syrian state of committing crime against humanity. This failure is primarily blamed on the China and Russia’s vetoes of UN resolution holding Syrian state of accountable for human atrocities (Adams, 2015: 5). As a result, in the last five years the Syrian violence continuously expanded and has become widely intractable and posed direct threat to its neighbouring states such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Each of these states contemplated the Syrian civil war, particularly ISIS as direct security threat to
their national interests from diverse but interrelated perspectives (humanitarian crisis, spreading conflict, threatening peace and stability, forcing millions of people for the exodus in neighbouring countries, and the expansion Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region). Irrespective of UNSC’s resolution (UN authorised military intervention) states such as Turkey, Jordan, France, US, UK have repeatedly conducted military operations both at collective or individual levels against the non-state terrorist groups such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Within this context, what has become markedly amplified, as “game changer” (Mohseni, 2015: 1) was the Kremlin’s military intervention in Syria – the first Russian military operation beyond its immediate abroad since the end of the Cold War. The Russian intervention not only changed the power politics in Syrian conflict, but also holds important consequences for international security. Politically speaking, there are various speculations about what kind of message does Kremlin try to deliver by its unexpected military intervention in Syria. It may have been an effort by Moscow to demonstrate its potentially important role in resolving Syrian conflict. At the same time, it may have been an attempt to show to the world that Russia retains de facto power in international affairs, particularly in international security (Kaim and Tamminga, 2015: 2-3). Moreover, Russian indiscriminate military operations against the opposition groups –mainly non-ISIS– that have been forcing thousands of Syrians, every day, for exodus to states that are already overburdened with millions of Syrian migrants such as Turkey, Greece, and Germany, might have been an attempt to pursue strategic and political gain against the EU and Turkey.

1.3. East Asia and East Europe

In the context of China, the country’s rapidly growing economy and military build-ups have exacerbated already tense geopolitics in East Asia (Mead, 2014). Its traditional rival, Japan, in response to China’s assertive measures, also increased its military expenditures by 3.5% in 2014 (The Economist, 2014). Japan’s increase in military expenditure is intended as a deterrence policy against Chinese hegemony, particularly in relation to the disputed island of Senkaku, (in Chinese, Diaoyu).

Since the end of the Cold War, states outside the Western world are becoming more concerned over their territorial sovereignty. The security advisor of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Mr Yosuke Isozaki said, there is no longer an era when Japan is permitted to do nothing and count on America to protect us. It has become extremely important we do our own share alongside the US (The Economist, 2014).
Given the importance of geopolitics in Asia, it would be naive to say that globalisation, economic interdependence, free trade, and promoting democracy will lead to security interdependence and peace. In reality, geopolitics is on the rise: states are becoming much more concerned about their territorial sovereignty and national identities. According to Buzan and Hansen (2009: 169), “East Asia’s rising powers might easily fall into a Classical Realist model of unstable interstate rivalry and balance of power”.

A pragmatic example in relation to the role of the state in international security is Russia’s assertive new foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The country’s invasion of Georgia and annexation of Crimea has revived geopolitics in Europe (Mead, 2014: 74). Significantly, one may find the Russian annexation of Crimea as ramification of EU’s enlargement and Europeanization policy, particularly towards the former Soviet satellite states. However, what matters in this article is to discuss the context and compatibility of the past theoretical assessments with the factual challenges that surround the contemporary international security. Since theories should constitute fundamental part of practice – a fact that occurred on ground – and it should be used to explain and address a practical problem (Creswell, 2009: 51), here, we take the contemporary rise of geopolitics in Eastern Europe as a pragmatic example and discuss it through the lens of critical schools of thought. First and most importantly when the contemporary security crisis in Eastern Europe is analysed in the realm of liberalism, the facts on ground demonstrate contradiction to the core claims of liberal school of thought that the democratic states sharing interests, particularly being economically interdependent, – so called “democratic peace theory” – are likely to seek cooperative solutions through international institutions (Rousseau and Walker, 2012: 21). For example, the current refugee crisis in Europe has fragmented the EU member states to the extent to which each member state executes divergent national refugee policies based upon individual socio-cultural, political and strategic interests. Although, the EU has pledged to assist Greece and Turkey and other smaller Balkan states that are struggling to cope with the overwhelming refugee crisis, states in EU and in its near abroad have remained autonomous authorities to control the flow of refugees into their controlled territories or to provide them transit routes to Western Europe. The question thus arises, how can the EU have a common interest when its member states’ economic and political interests are so diverse? Germany, for instance, is a loyal buyer of Russian gas, and for France, Russia is a good client who purchases its military hardware (Daley, 2014). Individual state interests may thus precede the collective interest of the EU. According to Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 7), inter-governmental organisations such as the EU and NATO “have minimal influence on state behaviour, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold
War world”. However, in relation to non-traditional international security issues, such as terrorism, pandemics, climate change, and narcotics trafficking, Russia has a common interest with the EU and NATO.

Significantly, it is also important to discuss the way in which EU and NATO as inter-governmental institutions encounter the contemporary EU security challenges. In this context institutionalists advocate that institutions make important difference in juxtaposing power with realities and thus play important role in security issues (Keohane and Martin, 2000: 387-388). The EU and NATO may have been considered as important institutions in balancing power, particularly against the contemporary Russian geopolitical and strategic insurrection in the Eastern Europe. But it should be also noted that the contemporary security challenges in the West (refugee issues, Ukraine crisis and Russian invasion of Crimea) has apparently shown that the institutionalisation of EU’s security policy is something extremely difficult to achieve if not impossible. To clarify this further, although, there have been series of summits and commitments to build and strengthen strategic and security partnership between NATO and EU – for example NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 2002, Lisbon Summit 2010, the Chicago Summit 2012 (NATO, 2015) – the EU and NATO has remained unable to exert collective security strategy to prevent, manage and control the contemporary security crisis in Europe. The daunting challenges to establish EU integrated centripetal security policy may vary from clash of national interest with EU institution in Brussels, lack of hard power, military capability, the gap between intention and the capacity to play role in international security (Mauer, 2012: 377). However, it is important to note that although EU’s enlargement strategy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – hegemonial strategy to create a security belt around EU – and EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) may have provided some kind of political and strategic integration to its member states within the EU institutional framework (Mauer, 2012: 375-378), internally the EU member states are deeply fragmented in decision-making process, particularly when issues such as security, national interest and sovereignty are in stake.

In sum, the EU is an inter-governmental organisation divided under the individual state led national political and economic interests. Particularly, given the current crisis in the EU (Ukraine crisis, and Russian annexation of Crimea, refugee problems) the EU’s CFSP has failed to exert a unanimous policy response to the contemporary security challenges. In her article in The Telegraph published on 26 July 2014, Janet Daley (2014) stated, “Europe will not and cannot act as an effective entity.” Thus, what matters here is not to discern or expect EU to act as a single collective Western state, but rather to emphasise that, even, when states share social, cultural, economic and political
interests, their security preference and perceptions – contradictory to the institutionalist theory – may vary at both domestic and international levels. At the same time, it would be naive to suggest, as Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan advocated, that the perception of collective security, for example the EU’s CFSP, would not allow the EU member states to focus on absolute and relative gains in the post-Cold War era (Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, 2000: 399). However, historically speaking, Western integration – collective security, aggregation of military forces such as establishment of NATO – had played important role in balancing power and containing Soviet expansion towards the West during the Cold War. But, the post-Cold War security challenges have raised certain questions on the role international institutions as well as intergovernmental organisations to seek cooperative solutions to the contemporary security challenges.

However, the EU is an important, collective, powerful intergovernmental institution, which has quickly expanded from six member states in 1950 to 28 member states in the present day. It is a very powerful political and economic entity, which plays a crucial role in international security. Since the end of the Cold War, EU politics and diplomacy have been preoccupied with the issues of democracy, individual liberty, free trade, globalisation, human rights, and climate change. Nevertheless, one of the main problems faced by the EU today is a lack of unity on its foreign policy, particularly in response to the recent escalation of geopolitical issues in Eastern Europe (Crimea and Georgia).

Here, it is important to question how to define limits to the national interests of the states under the norms of international diplomacy and international law. There has been a long debate amongst the scholars, policy makers and politicians about the rule of law in international relations. Significantly, when a state perceives an issue as a threat to its very existence and sovereignty, it deems no bound to international law or any other intergovernmental institutions. For instance, raising concerns over the recent escalation of terrorist attacks and insecurity across the country, in a televised address, the President Erdogan stated that “Turkey dose not need permission from anyone – we will do what is necessary” (Yackley, 2015). The issues of insecurity, particularly those associated with religious extremism and terrorism in South Asia and Middle East has shown that states have retained their de facto importance in international security. On the other hand when it comes to role of international organisations such as UNSC, NATO, EU, Arab League and African Union, these institutions failed to take decisive action to prevent war, crime against humanity and terrorism in Syria, Iraq and Crimea. Nonetheless, they have been playing important role for calling international attention towards the humanitarian crisis and providing some materialistic aid to the victims.
Pandemic: Threat to International Security

The concept of international security studies has changed since the end of the Cold War. Traditional security challenges, the arms race (particularly nuclear weapons), and the deterrence policy which thwarted the expansion of rival ideologies between the Eastern and Western blocs have faded since the end of the Cold War, but the non-traditional security issues that currently preoccupy politicians and policy makers are not things that have newly emerged since the end of the Cold War. Such threats existed prior to the colonial era and took the lives of millions of men, women, and children all around the world.

Throughout history, the emergence of deadly infectious diseases, such as the Black Death, cholera, and AIDS, has continuously posed threats to the existence of the human race. The influenza plague of 1918, which originated in Kansas is estimated to have caused 25 million deaths, a number, which exceeded the casualties of the First World War (Terrif et al., 1999: 131). According to Elbe (2010: 164) AIDS kills more than 2 million people annually around the world. When these deadly viruses started causing a potential threat to international security, the European states held the First International Sanitary Conference in Paris, to discuss ways to deal with these non-traditional threats to international security (Elbe, 2010: 163). Nonetheless, although epidemic was acquired as a matter of high politics in mid 19th century by European states (Elbe, 2010: 163), infectious pathogens were not considered as primary concern to international security. The securitisation of epidemic diseases as main referent of ISS has risen markedly on international agenda only in post-Cold War. For most of scholars of security studies, the post-Cold War was a rightly geopolitical landmark to broaden the concept of ISS.

However, after the failure of liberal international institution, League of Nations, to prevent World War II scholars such as Kenneth Boulding and Johan Galtung had started to probe for new ways to develop answer for pressing question of how to predict and prevent conflicts. In this context, Boulding developed the theory of “conflict resolution” in which he had assessed ways to predict conflict by gathering social, political and economic knowledge in a society (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 43). Later, Galtung’s remarkable work disclosing variable factors of conflict such as structural violence (absence of social, cultural, religious, economic and health threats to individuals) as well as concepts of “negative and positive peace”; the former related with the physical violence, and the later associated with structural violence (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2011: 44), has become a sign of paradigm shift in the history conflict and security studies. Particularly, the notion of positive peace has become the flagship of not only conflict resolution but also provided a new sight and perception to peace and security studies since in 1960s.
In the contemporary world of globalisation, where issues in one state can easily penetrate across borders, the spread of pandemic viruses threatens international security. However, it is noteworthy that most outbreaks of deadly viruses mainly occur in the developing world, particularly in Africa. It is also important to note that the governing institutions in developing countries are mostly state-centric, authoritarian, and less democratic in form than much of the developed world. Thus, it is the state that plays a central role in the response to such non-traditional threats to international security. Given the example of the state’s role in taking preventive measures against the outbreak of the Ebola pandemic in Nigeria and Senegal, it can be seen that the state remains a decisive actor in dealing with pandemic threats to international security. On the other hand, non-state international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) play an inevitable role in providing “information about the outbreaks of new infectious disease” which “is no longer under the sole control of sovereign states” (Elbe, 2010: 169). In the example of the recent Ebola outbreak in Western Africa, non-state health organisations played precisely this kind of role, providing information about the outbreak and calling for international attention toward the threat of the virus to international security. However, it failed to take successful preventive action to control the outbreak. In fact, it was the governments of Nigeria and Senegal that were able to successfully take preventive measures and eliminated the Ebola virus from these countries. The Ebola outbreak has once again has shown us that no matter how scholars of security studies discern and advocate non-state and/or inter-governmental organisation as fundamental actors in the post-Cold War international security, state remains as de facto powers controlling commanding heights in determining security at all levels. In this context, Krause and Williams (1997: 35) stated that, [s]imply articulating a broad range of newly emerging or newly recognised threats to human survival or well-being will not in itself move security studies away from its traditional concerns. However, it should be noted that it is not to say that inter-governmental or non-governmental organisations act according to the liberal, institutional, or any other critical theories, in fact they don’t. What is important to emphasise here is whether these theories are ways through which we can make sense of international security or not.

On 18 September 2014, the UNSC called the Ebola virus a threat to international security (UN News Centre, 2014). The US President, Barack Hussein Obama, called the Ebola outbreak “A Global Threat” and deployed 3,000 troops to help defeat the virus (Fox, 2014). Most critical security studies emphasise that such non-traditional threats to international security “have no particular geographic locus” and “cannot be managed by traditional defence” forces (Tarrif et al., 1999: 115-116). Therefore, it is less the state-controlled
military forces but rather doctors, nurses and health workers that are needed to fight against the pathogenic enemies of international security. However, in the context of response to Ebola outbreak, there have been series of critics by health activists and non-governmental institutions such as Harvard Global Health Institute, particularly on WHO’s role in handling and developing effective measures to fight against the deadly virus since its discovery in 1948 (Ap, 2015; Walt, 2014). The Ebola outbreak exposed multi-layered systematic flaws in the way in which inter-governmental and non-governmental health institutions have handled pandemic crisis. These challenges range from political and bureaucratic constraints to lack of ownership, responsibility and leadership within inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations such as WHO and NGOs (DuBois et al., 2015: 15-16). Similarly, it is also worth noting that, indeed, states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea have failed to cope with Ebola crisis. However, it was not something unknown to an international inter-governmental health organisations such as WHO – which has international mandate for tackling global health crisis (DuBois et al., 2015: 16) – that these states seriously lacked infrastructure, professional human capital, adequate medical laboratories, funds, besides other serious issues such as corruption (both in state and private spheres). Nevertheless, despite these challenges, as stated earlier, it was the African states such as Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone that exerted decisive and strict measures to fight against deadly pandemic (DuBois et al., 2015: 3).

Importantly, it was not only the less democratic African states that played crucial role in the fight against Ebola outbreak, but also the governments of the UK, US, Germany, and many other Western and non-Western states, have sent professional staff and economic assistance and took preventive actions, such as banning airlines from the Ebola stricken countries. Consequently, although non-state health organisations, including the WHO and NGOs, play an important role in providing information about the outbreak and calling for international attention, the state remains a crucial actor in dealing with such threats to international security.

Securing Human Rights

Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was unanimously adopted by the UN member states soon after World War II, the world remains divided on many epistemological and ontological perspectives and on the practice of human rights universally, regardless of cultural and religious differences. The definition of human rights for the purposes of this paper involves protection from “genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity and ethnic cleansing” (Bellamy, 2010: 436).
The post-Cold War literature on international security is divided. Some scholars view the post-Cold War era as a triumph of “democratic peace”, while others advocate a “two-worlds” system, which includes both a “democratic zone of peace among capitalist core states”, and “a zone of conflict in the periphery” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 167). It is worth noting that states can play a dominant role in both providing security and being perpetrators of insecurity against their own citizens in the developing world. Given examples such as Rwanda, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Colombia, it is apparent that most of the violence against human rights occurs in Africa, Asia, and South America.

Despite the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the notion of state security has altered to emphasise human security, atrocities against humanity have increased. The concept of human security concerned not only securing human rights, but rather it emerged from a United Nations Development Program Report in 1994, in a response to the atrocities that happened in Somalia and Rwanda. Moreover, human security places people at its epicentre and expands the security agenda to include freedom from fear (fear of violence) and freedom from want (protect the fundamental economic, social and environmental rights of people) (Kerr, 2013: 106-107; Hampson, 2013: 280-282). In the context of securing human rights, the proponents of freedom from fear or freedom from want have failed to draw enough attention in the international arena to reduce atrocities against human beings. Either states themselves have become perpetrators, suppressing citizens based on lust for power, or non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, insurgents, and criminals, have used humans as tools to exert political or criminal influence against states or international organisations. Moreover, the absence of the patronage system of Cold War politics in the developing world has led states to seek regional power. However, it is notable that not all states work against human rights is the same. In states such as Norway, Japan and Canada “foreign policies were replete with references to human security” (Kerr, 2013: 105). However, advocates of the securing of the fundamental rights of human beings by many Western states and inter-governmental agencies, including the UN and NGOs, had a different impact in the developing world. The degradation of the state-centric approach and escalation of individualism has raised issues of sovereignty and ethnic identity in the developing world. Thus, inter-state warfare has been replaced by intra-state warfare in the post-Cold War era. The turning point in the context of securing human rights may have been the tragedy of Rwandan genocide and ethnic cleansing, which occurred at a time when politicians, policy makers, and scholars of international security studies in the developed world were making an effort to restructure international security studies by questioning what is “meant by security: what is being secured, what
is being secured against, who provides security and what are the approaches to ensure security?” and the answers to these questions were mainly, “individuals are the true referent of security” (Terrif et al., 1999: 131-133).

However, the tragedy of Rwandan genocide illustrates the futility of all these traditional and critical theories. The international community, under the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, watched in vain the ethnic cleansing in which the majority Hutus slaughtered around 800,000 minority Tutsis (including moderate Hutus who provided shelter to Tutsis) in less than four months in 1994 (Berdal, 2005: 117). The Rwandan case is an example that demonstrates how both states and non-state organisations failed to provide security for the country’s citizens during the ethnic conflict. From the atrocities in Rwanda in the 1990s to the current Syrian humanitarian crisis, the question of who is responsible for securing human rights remains unanswered.

In the post-Cold War era, the world is divided on the issue of who should be responsible for securing human rights. According to Mutimer, in their book, Critical Security Studies: Concept and Cases, Krause and Williams argued that, by looking at individuals and…the communities in which they live, a critical security study has to take seriously the ideas, norms, and values that constitute the communities that are to be secured (Mutimer, 2013: 71).

According to Kerr (2013: 114), human security “puts the onus on realism to explain why the state is the referent object if it is not a means to people’s security.” Whereas, realists emphasise that states are important and responsible actors in the provision of security for individuals and international communities (Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 1994-1995; Doyle, 2000).

For the developing world, the West serves as a role model. According to Mohammad Ayoob (2004: 101), the “new states that have acquired the formal trappings of sovereignty only recently” are overly concerned with sovereignty of state when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Ayoob (2004: 100) expresses scepticism about the role of the international community (Western world) in providing security for human rights in developing world:

“When intervention takes place without UN authorisations or where the UN Security Council’s decision to authorise…intervention is perceived to be the result of arm twisting on the part of the major powers, especially the United States.”

Given the role of non-state, inter-governmental, or regional organisations, including the UNSC and NATO, in the provision of security for individuals, the issue of selectivity due to geostrategic, economic, and political interests has created deep concern and scepticism in the developing world. According to Bellamy (2005), liberal proclamations of moral duty in securing
human rights faded under abuse of the UNSC’s Chapter VII, use of power to maintain peace, in the Iraqi case. Preservation of the right of veto by the five permanent member states of the UNSC became a tool to exert geostrategic, economic, and political interests.

In the case of the genocide in Rwanda, the first attempt to resolve the conflict and secure the rights of the Rwandan citizens came under the interim government of the Tutsi (United Human Rights Council, 2014). This is not to say that the government was the only body that played an important role in resolving the conflict and providing security for Rwandan individuals; neighbouring states such as Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda, alongside the UN and the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), also played critical roles in sustaining peace and security in the country (Wolpe, 2011: 10-11).

In attempting to secure human rights, the UNSC has encountered a range of hurdles ranging from selectivity, veto rights, and lack of potential power to respond rapidly to humanitarian crises around the world. In particular, the authorisation of humanitarian intervention by the UNSC and veto rights on the basis of selectivity (geopolitics, economic, and political) have raised concerns over authenticity and the role of international inter-governmental organisations in securing human rights, and it has thus been argued that the UNSC is not an effective and responsible unit that can provide security for human rights.

States in the developing world are thus sceptical about the role of international actors such as the UNSC, NATO, and the EU in international security. Given the example of so-called humanitarian intervention in Iraq, and later in Libya, the Western policy of regime change in the name of human rights has shown the important role of states as inevitable structures that are responsible for providing security for citizens. One of the consequences of regime change in the name of humanitarian intervention, such as in Iraq, was to demolish crucial institutions, such as the military, police, and the judiciary, in their entirety, but it was Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime, including his family members and those close to him who were assigned to top posts in these institutions who were the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, not the institutions themselves. States are indispensable alongside the non-state actors that play important and decisive roles in securing human rights; in the words of Waltz (1959: 89), “At a minimum, government exists to provide security to persons and their property.”

**Conclusion**

In spite of the fact that non-state actors have gained recognition in the international system since the end of the Cold War, states remain the de facto power in international security. One of the important roles of non-state actors is
to pressure states to act responsibly in matters of domestic and international security. Inter-governmental actors, such as the UNSC and EU, mobilise a number of methods, from economic sanctions to the total isolation of a state from the international community or humanitarian interventions, as a last resort when a state fails to carry out its responsibilities in domestic and international security. However, these actions are subject to the selectivity approach of international powers—for example, the UN authorisation of humanitarian intervention in Libya based on violations of human rights, oppression, and practice of undemocratic means of governance, while overlooking similar issues in states such as Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, based on geostrategic, economic, and political interests of major powers.

The consequences of the intervention in Iraq, dismantling the state and changing the regime, have demonstrated that the state is an indispensable element in maintaining security within its territory and region. It is important to note that since the emergence of the Westphalian system, the state has remained as a legitimate political entity playing a vital role in domestic and international politics and security. However, in a state, it is important to note the way in which it functions. It may be a people-centric democratic state, where “[l]egitimacy is an endorsement of the state by citizens” (Gilley, 2006: 502) or a state-centric authoritarian state, where people have no, or a minimal, role in building the state. In either case, the state is formed from indispensable components such as the judiciary, legislature, and executive and government departments that make the state a powerful entity able to play an important role in domestic and international politics and security. In contrast to non-state actors, a state occupies a specific geography, represents people of single or many ethnic groups with a single national identity (democratic or non-democratic) and practices political and military power at domestic and international levels.

Since the end of the Cold War, significant progress has been made towards securing human rights and elevating the responsibilities of states towards their citizens by the UN, the Western states and NGOs. However, this kind of phenomenon put pressure on developing states, where countries are run by an undemocratic means of governance (kingdom, military junta, authoritarian regimes), to adopt a people-centric system of government and to take on responsibilities. Furthermore, although, according to UN Resolution 1674 in 2006 (Bellamy, 2013: 293), in cases where the state fails to fulfil its responsibility in protecting the rights of its citizens it becomes the responsibility of the international society, in the majority of examples of humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War (Iraq in 1991 and 2003; Haiti; Rwanda; East Timor; Liberia; Georgia and Cote d’Ivoire) the main intervening actors have been states such as the US, UK, Russia and France, rather than
international society. Thus, whether relating to intra-state, inter-state or international security or insecurity, states have continued to be de facto actors. It is important to note that in the context of humanitarian intervention, states in the developing world are usually the host countries, whereas the Western states are intervening. This is because states in the developing world have remained economically and politically weaker and unable to adopt fast changing technological advancements, globalisation, political and economic reforms. Thus, when states in the developing world refuse to accept, or fail to adopt, Western imposed political and economic reforms, or fail, or refuse, to accept accountability for domestic and international security, rather than overthrowing a functioning state under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, it is important to use various methods of diplomacy. These include placing regional, international and non-governmental organisations in roles that will strengthen the capability of a state and enable it to resist any treats to its citizens and its existence.

In the context of humanitarian interventions, it has become clear to all that, whether in Iraq or Libya, the consequences of interventions often entail an escalation of insecurity. At the same time, it has become also clear regional, and international organisations, such as the UNSC, NATO, the Arab League, and the African Union, have failed to take effective measures against the aftermath of security challenges and interventions. These institutions seriously lack unity and potential power to rapidly act in response to needs of states when they are unable or fail to secure rights of their citizens or refuses to accept accountability in international security. Moreover, humanitarian intervention is not an undiscriminating universally applied use of force to protect human rights. Indeed, given the examples of Somalia, Rwanda and the recent atrocities against the Rohingya minorities in Myanmar and Syrian crisis, humanitarian intervention is a highly selective agenda that reflects the geostrategic, economic and political interests of powerful states.

The contemporary world has become global anarchy where issues of balance of power, hegemony, economic and military power competition have shaped the core agenda of diplomacy, particularly in non-Western states. One of the important developments in the context of international security is states are involved in proxy warfare using non-state forces as surrogates to exert geostrategic and geopolitical interests. This has raised the question about the rule of law in international arena, which has become a cliché debate amongst scholars, analysts and policy makers in international relation and international politics. Given the examples of social, cultural, economic and political integrations, the free movement of people without visa restrictions and military co-operation between the Western states (including some non-Western developed states, such as Japan), the proclaims of liberal democracy may have
been true for the Western world, but the classical realist theory, regional hegemony, interstate rivalry for economic and military power politics, have dominated the world outside the West since the end of the Cold War. Thus, states are preoccupied with geopolitical issues (disputes over borders and resources), military power and the arms race, economic and political hegemony at regional and international levels. Consequently, the state, in particular, plays an essential role in international security in the world outside the Western orbit. In other words, in the majority of the world, states depict and determine security at both national and international levels.

Kaynakça


creates-syrian-chaos/2014/10/02/061fb50c-4a7a-11e4-a046-120a8a855cca_story.html (10.01.2015).


Waltz, Kenneth. N. (1959), Man, the State and War (Columbia: Columbia University Press).


