JOHNSON'S 1964 LETTER TO İNÖNÜ AND THE GREEK LOBBYING AT THE WHITE HOUSE*

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The Cyprus conflict is a very complex one, with ramifications on four different levels: a. the inter-communal (in Cyprus itself); b. the bi-lateral (involving Turkey and Greece); c. the regional (with the participation of Great Britain and the Super-Powers); and d. the international (in the global contest at the United Nations). These levels have often overlapped, particularly since 1964, when the conflict became more acute with the increasing involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the important steps leading to Super-Power intervention in the Cyprus issue relates to the exchange of letters between United States President Lyndon B. Johnson and Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü in 1964.

President Johnson's letter to İnönü of June 5, 1964 may justifiably be seen as marking a turning point in Turkish-American relations. Mehmet Gönlübol, Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Ankara, has stated that the letter "became the most important factor since World War II to affect the relations between the

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1 This article does not intend to delve into the Cyprus conflict as such, nor to list bibliographical data on it. Out of the vast literature, one of the most recent items, presenting widely diverging views of Cypriots, Turks, Greeks and others, is a special sixteen-page issue of the weekly Das Parlament (Bonn), XXV (38): Sep. 20, 1975.

two countries unfavorably. This document... was received with
great surprise and created strong repercussions, not only in lef-
tist circles, but in public opinion as a whole". Although it
ostensibly led to a momentary decrease of tension, the letter
actually initiated the process of estrangement between the two
states, which, despite some indications to the contrary, has been
steadily increasing ever since.

In the spring of 1964, President Johnson was informed that
Turkish decision-makers and the broader public favored inter-
vention in Cyprus on behalf of the Cypriot Turks about whose
safety the Turks were extremely apprehensive. Turkish military
preparations appeared to confirm this intention to intervene.
Johnson's letter to İnönü, although couched in those friendly
terms engendered by the language of diplomacy, strongly en-
deavored to dissuade the Turkish Government from intervening
in Cyprus. In brief, the letter warned the Turks not to act with-
out first consulting with the United States Government; it
reminded İnönü “in all candor that the United States cannot
agree to the use of any United States supplied military equip-
ment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present cir-
cumstances.”

İnönü's reply to Johnson, dated June 13, 1964, reserved Turkey's
freedom of action in Cyprus. Several weeks later, Turkish pla-
nes flew over Cyprus, and engaged in a strafing attack on the
Greeks. Although İnönü proclaimed in the National Assembly
that the Turkish nation should prepare for war¹, Johnson's 1964
letter had achieved its main purpose at that time, averting a
massive Turkish invasion of Cyprus and a rift between two
NATO members, Turkey and Greece². Ten years later, in July,
1974 (by which time Johnson and İnönü had died), the threat-
tened invasion and rift did finally occur.

The Turkish press learned of Johnson’s letter to İnönü
immediately and reported on it with front page banner head-

3 Mehmet Gönülbol, “Turkish-American relations: a general appraisal,”
Dış Politika (Ankara), I (4): Dec. 1971, p. 70. See also Nihat Erim, “Reminiscen-
4 Turkish press of September 9, 1964.
5 See Mehmet Gönülbol, “Nato and Turkey: an overall appraisal,” The Tur-
21-23.
lines. *Hürriyet* announced that "the United States has again opposed our setting out [for Cyprus]." Only vague, hypothetical reports of the content of the letter appeared in the Turkish press, but these sufficed to embarrass the Government and affect İnönü’s Republican People’s Party’s representation in the Senate, after the June 7, 1964 elections. News about the letter from foreign sources began to filter into the Turkish press. The editorial "Durum" ("The situation") in *Milliyet* warned that "The last event will be a turning point in Turco-American relations;" it also protested what it considered the threatening tone of the letter. No less vehemently, the Opposition in the National Assembly criticized İnönü and his Government harshly, accusing them of "bowing down to Johnson." The Opposition then proposed a "no confidence" motion. Although, on June 19, İnönü’s Government did obtain a vote of confidence on the matter in the National Assembly, its margin was very slim (194 supported the no confidence motion and 2 abstained, while 200 opposed the motion).

In the ensuing months, the issue of Johnson’s letter - whose text had not yet been made public - reappeared sporadically. It was generally brought up by İnönü’s opponents, who raised it again in the electoral campaign of 1965, when the whole of the National Assembly was standing for re-election. The Turkish Government finally requested that the United States release the Johnson-İnönü correspondence of June, 1964, probably in order to end rumors. The White House did so in mid-January, 1966, and the two letters appeared in Turkish and American newspapers. Their publication stirred up some acrimonious debate in the Turkish press, as well as in the Turkish National Assembly and Senate. The controversy eventually blew over, but it contributed its share to an increase in anti-American feeling. This is well exemplified by the following excerpt from a letter written to President Johnson by Robert R. Chase, Jr., an American Peace-Corps volunteer in Bandırma, dated January 16, 1966.

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6 "Amerika, çıkarmamızı yine önledi."
7 June 10, 1964.
“Mr. President: I am a member of the Peace Corps serving in Turkey. In recent weeks, as you are undoubtedly aware, the Turkish press has given considerable play to a letter written by you to former Turkish Prime Minister İnönü. The letter written by you as well as İnönü’s reply have been published and discussed at length. Hardly a day goes by without one of my fellow teachers bringing up the American Cyprus policy and your letter. I have told my friends time and again that because my Turkish is not good enough to understand the letters as they appear in the newspaper I would rather not get into any arguments; this excuse, however, is no longer accepted as readily as it was several days ago. I have told my Turkish associates that I would write to you and try to get a copy of both letters in English so that we would talk about them on equal ground. This brings me to my point. I would like you to send me by the quickest way possible, a copy of your letter to İnönü and if possible a translation of his answer. I would also appreciate any information on the present U.S. position on Cyprus. This information will be very useful to me, as I am sure it would be to other Peace Corps personnel here in Turkey.”

From the perspective of the present it is easier to see the critical nature of Johnson’s letter and it is appropriate to inquire into what considerations prompted the President to write this letter in the first place. Although the files of the State Department are still classified, a large portion of the White House files of the Johnson era are available for research at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. The material in this library, which has to date hardly been utilized by scholars, enables us to offer, for the first time, several tentative observations on the background of Johnson’s letter to İnönü and on the impact of pro-Greek lobbying. American publications have hardly taken any notice of the letter, and Johnson’s autobiogra-

9 On which see data in Jacob M. Landau, Radical politics in modern Turkey, Leiden, Brill, 1974, pp. 26–28, 33, 249, 290.

10 The original is in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Gen CO 296 (box 71). See also the following footnote, about materials in this library.

11 The files relating to Turkey and to the Johnson letter are in Ex CO 296 (box 70) and Gen CO 296 (box 71). I am grateful for the permission to use these files and quote from them.

12 The text of the letter is in Gen CO 296 (box 71).
graphy makes no mention of it. The same is true of all monographs about Johnson's Presidency which we have consulted.

It is obvious that the State Department was most interested in maintaining good relations with both Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, the strongest possible motivation for Johnson's letter was the desire to prevent Turkish military action in Cyprus, which could well have broken down NATO's eastern flank and possibly have brought about a Turco-Greek war. For Johnson, this was a "war-or-peace" issue; and, at a critical moment, he adopted a hard line to press for peace. The files at the Johnson Library also provide valuable information concerning the extensive Greek effort to impress its case upon the White House. The Turks have long suspected the existence of strong Greek pressure on the White House regarding the Cyprus conflict; we may now attempt to evaluate the nature of this pressure and the extent of Greek lobbying efforts with reference to Cyprus.

Although the public and press in the United States mistrust lobbying and, in the post-World War II era, have reacted violently against it several times, lobbying goes on nonetheless. Under Federal laws enacted in the early 1960's, only persons lobbying before the legislative branch are required to register as such. Perhaps it is because executive branch lobbyists do not have to register that we know relatively little about how White House lobbying works. Interest groups desire access to

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17 Ibid., p. 23: "We would certainly wish to know more about executive branch lobbying."
the Chief Executive of the United States, hoping for a sympathetic response to their proposals. The President, on the other hand, requires the cooperation and political support that interest groups can provide. Consequently, Executive strategy and interest-group strategy frequently interact.

The list of ethnic Executive lobbies, including those intervening in American foreign policy, is a long one; these lobbyists have frequently been at least as successful as others. While it is still impossible, according to our present knowledge, to have a complete picture of the means by which the policies desired by Greek-Americans are fed into the overall decision-making process of United States Government agencies, we may examine the process by considering a single case study, the drafting of Johnson’s letter to İnönü as a result of White House lobbying.

The Greeks in the United States were quicker than most other immigrants - who had not previously faced the need of adapting as minority groups in their countries of origin - to develop effective community organizations suited to the American scene. At first, these organizations were dedicated to maintaining the church, to promoting various intellectual, musical or athletic activities, and to assisting the process of assimilation. The two main trends, essentially contradictory, were represented by such groups as the Greek American Progressive Association (GAPA), striving for the preservation of Hellenic culture among the immigrants, and the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), working for smoother and speedier Americanization. Both these groups were set up in the early 1920’s. It is significant to note that the first comprised about 10,000 members in good standing, and the second some 25,000 active members in more than 400 chapters, divided among 24 districts.


20 Cf. ibid., pp. 93, 94.
It was only a matter of time before Greek-Americans began to use these groups and others for political purposes, displaying a talent for acquiring the fine art of political pressure. This occurred chiefly after 1940. By then, their Americanism had been achieved and was being taken for granted. Since Greece was constantly in sympathy with the United States on international issues, the problem of conflicting allegiances never arose. Philhellenism increased and identification with Greece prevailed—in praise of its brave stand against the Nazis, relief-work, support for the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and in general through the revived interest of Greek-Americans in their mother-country. Groups of Greek-Americans not only fostered pro-Greek public sentiment in the United States after World War II, but even petitioned Congress and the President for adoption of policies of their preference.

In the late 1950's and 1960's, Cyprus became a focal point of lobbying for various Greek-Americans, who pressured their Senators and Congressmen to adopt the Greek position in the Cyprus conflict. However, these efforts were never really successful, at least not until 1964. In that year the concentrated effort to influence the President himself brought about a breakthrough with his adoption (albeit temporary) of the Greek position in the Cyprus conflict, at least to the extent of preventing Turkey from intervening and creating a fait accompli. The Greek-Americans would undoubtedly have preferred to have the United States intervene by force to achieve this goal (e.g. a Sixth Fleet blockade of Cyprus against Turkey or deployment of Marines on the island); however, this was inconceivable, as it would have led to Turkey's withdrawal from NATO and CENTO. Thus, Johnson's letter to İnönü was the next best step from the Greek-American point of view.

Greek-American activity was a part of a wider effort by Greeks in Greece, Cyprus and elsewhere, directed at influencing policymakers in Washington on the Cyprus issue. This was expressed by simultaneously lobbying in Congress and (even more strenuously) at the White House. The former does not concern us here. The latter was characterized by the magnitude, frequency, organization, and insistence of Greek communications during the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

Numerous cables, telephone calls, letters and memos reached the White House during the first half of 1964; nearly all of them were designed to influence Presidential policy towards Cyprus. Much of the correspondence stressed the alleged discrimination or even persecution of Greeks in Turkey. A White House Office “route slip” stated that as of June 26, 1964, 2,598 letters concerning this matter had been received at the White House! Thus this lobbying-by-communication relied on the sheer amount of correspondence and intended to impress the White House with the ability of Greek-Americans to mobilize a grassroots campaign; the deluge of communications was one of the main reasons for the success.

Cables and letters to the White House were sent both by private persons and by various associations connected with people of Greek descent. Among the associations, listed chronologically according to dates of their communications, for a period of about half a year, from November, 1963, to June 5, 1964, are the following: The Cyprus Federation of America (New York City), The Hellenic Society of Constantinople (New York City), The Justice for Cyprus Committee (claiming many branches throughout the United States), The Council for Hellenic Affairs (New York City), the Greek-American Progressive Association (New York City), the United Organizations of Greek-Americans, the Hellenic-American Central Committee for Cyprus (Greater New York), the American Friends of Cyprus Committee (New York City) and the Greek-American Democratic Club (New York City).

24 Their communications are now in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, in the files on Turkey: Ex CO 296 (box 70) and Gen CO 296 (box 71); and in those on Cyprus: Ex CO 56 (box 26) and Gen CO 56 (box 27).
Of these, only the Greek-American Progressive Association, already mentioned, was a truly national organization. The United Organizations of Greek-Americans probably did have several branches, but their claim to represent one-and-a-half million Americans of Greek descent is certainly exaggerated. The other groups were largely based in New York City, and they were responsible for most of the communications to Johnson - several of them despatching more than one cable. A cable was also sent on behalf of "the clergy and lay representatives of 72 Greek-Orthodox communities of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, meeting in the Holy Trinity Cathedral ... New York," perhaps to obviate the impression that only New York City Greeks were involved. In addition, Greek organizations in Greece, Cyprus, South Africa and Scotland cabled the White House, expressing their support for the Greek position in the Cyprus conflict, as did numerous private persons in the United States - most of them bearing Greek names.

Some of the above groups and persons kept bombarding Johnson with cables and letters for months after June 5, 1964, commending his letter to İnönü and urging him to continue what they considered to be his justified approach. While it is impossible at present to get a definitive picture of how Greek White House lobbying was coordinated, it is most likely that the 1964 recruiting of so many private individuals and associations, for a sustained campaign of sending numerous and similar messages, does indicate some sort of overall organization.

In order to better appreciate the significance of the messages sent before June 5, 1964, and in order to draw certain conclusions as to the arguments they raised, we present two characteristic quotes from among the cables.

1. "Dear Mr. President: We believe the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister offers a rare opportunity for tempering the crisis over Cyprus. We trust that our Government has informed the Turkish Government that any invasion of Cyprus would violate the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, and would require our Government to stop all military and other aid to

25 See ibid., for communications by Greek-Americans and Greeks before and after June 5, 1964.
Turkey. But a personal statement by you to the Turkish Foreign Minister to this effect would be most helpful in preventing any disastrous adventure by Turkey in Cyprus. We hope that the opportunity will also be used to impress on the Turkish Foreign Minister the fact that his Government's support of the extraordinary veto power of the 17.5% Turkish minority is unreasonable and provocative. The Cyprus problem is a needless tragedy that endangers the Atlantic Alliance, threatens world peace, and inflicts great suffering on the people of Cyprus. Firm action on your part in support of the principle of majority rule will do much to achieve a peaceful solution."^{26}

2. "The President - The White House: The Greek-American Democratic Club of Queens Incorporated during its regular assembly meeting held at its headquarters 104-26 Roosevelt Avenue Corona, New York, on April 24th 1964 unanimously passed the following resolution, 'Resolved that the Greek-American Club of Queens Incorporated strongly protests the persecution of the Orthodox Church and the unjustified deportation from Istanbul of respected and law abiding Orthodox churchmen and Greek-Turkish citizens and fervently requests that strong representations be made to the Turkish Government to cease and desist from any further persecution of the Orthodox church and the Greek-Turkish citizenry of Istanbul.' This resolution was also endorsed by the Northside Democratic Association of the Fifth Assembly District, Queens."^{27}

From the above, as well as other messages, it is clear that the main argument promoted was the right of the Greek majority to rule Cyprus; this was rendered all the more valid by the alleged persecution of Greeks in Turkey. These two points were frequently linked and elaborated upon; others, such as Cyprus's right to self-determination and the bond of friendship between the American and Greek peoples were often raised. In addition, quite a number of messages implicitly or explicitly referred to Johnson's candidacy for President, thus reminding

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^{26} Ibid., Gen CO 296, cable from The Council for Hellenic Affairs, Inc., The American Friends of Cyprus Committee, New York, dated April 24, 1964.

^{27} Ibid., cable from the Greek-American Democratic Club of Queens, N. Y., Inc., dated May 7, 1964.
Johnson of the Greek-American power to raise voter support for the Democratic Party.

Having become President as a result of the assassination of J.F. Kennedy, Johnson was at first keenly aware of the need to continue Kennedy's main policies, particularly in the area of foreign relations, where he was less experienced than his predecessor. Furthermore, for Johnson, foreign policy was inextricably integrated into the process of domestic politics. True, Cyprus had never engaged the interest of the United States Congress during Johnson's administration to the same degree as had Panama, the Dominican Republic or Vietnam. However, when Cyprus-oriented political pressures in the United States began building up, especially from the Greek-Americans, Johnson acted speedily and decisively.

The letter to İnönü was partially motivated by the swiftly approaching trial-of-strength, the November 1964 U.S. Presidential elections. Several pollsters predicted a close contest, and Greek-Americans were not only far more numerous than Turkish ones, but were located in some of the large urban centers which controlled large numbers of electors. Undoubtedly, Johnson was very aware of the fact that all votes count, but some count more, depending on location. The exact number of Greek-Americans depends on the definition of "Greek", and, even so, the statistics show discrepancies. According to the official 1960 Census of Population, there were then close to 400,000 Greek-Americans in the United States; other sources estimated their number as between 500,000 and 600,000. They were scattered all over the country, with heavy concentration in the Northeastern and North-Central states. Very few had settled in rural areas; theirs was an almost exclusively urban pattern of living. They resided mostly in Chicago, New York City and, to a lesser extent, in Boston and Detroit. One should remember that one state, Illinois, had been crucial in the 1960 Presidential elections.

In addition, ethnic voters in the United States generally vote in blocs. While no study has yet been made of how Greek-Americans tend to vote on the national level, Greek bloc-voting was observed on the local level, when candidates for local office appealed to Greek-American constituents on the basis of common ethnic background. Moreover, ethnic groups in the United States have generally voted the Democratic ticket; therefore, Republican strategy has entailed a consistent attempt to break up Democratic bloc votes. Up to 1960, the Republicans had failed, but Democratic strategists remained concerned. Some Democrats, including Johnson, were most probably concerned about how American policy in Cyprus might affect the Greek-American vote in the November 1964 Presidential elections. This is evident in a memorandum by Herbert W. Klotz (then Assistant Secretary of Commerce) to Bill Moyers (a trusted aide on the White House staff). Datelined Washington, D.C., October 15, 1964, it began as follows, “As you know, the Goldwater forces have made a considerable effort to sway American voters of Greek descent by trading on the Cyprus issue.” There can be little doubt that messages similar to this one had reached Johnson’s desk as well.

The Church, too, did its share of lobbying before the President. Religious institutions in the United States have sometimes been used as conduits for ethnic political desires. The Greek Church was no exception, although a difference may be observed. Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans are almost exclusively Catholic and express themselves politically to a large or even primary extent through the instrument of the Catholic Church. In contrast, the Greek-Americans are split into Orthodox and Catholic groups, a factor which makes it almost inevitable that they would express common political interests through voluntary associations rather than through the Churches. Nevertheless, Church activities were particularly intensified in the months remaining before the November 1964 Presidential elections.

30 Vlachos, p. 98.
31 The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Gen CO 94, Greece (box 36).
Perhaps the most articulate of the Greek-Americans who sent messages to Johnson was Iakovos, Archbishop of the Greek-Orthodox Church of North and South America. He was based in New York City and published a regular *Press Release from the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*. In addition to sending the *Press Release* to the White House, Iakovos wrote or cabled President Johnson repeatedly, demanding an interview with him; this was granted, eventually, in March, 1966. The following quotations are taken from two representative examples of his lobbying efforts prior to the 1964 elections. One cable33 began with the following phrase, “We, five thousand Americans of Hellenic descent....” and a letter34, alleging persecution of the Greek-Orthodox in Turkey, ended with the words “... You can be assured that your intervention will win you the gratitude of the Greek-Orthodox all over the world, as well as of the vast American community of Greek extraction.”

The issue remained relevant even later in that Johnson was still planning to run for reelection. In a White House memorandum, Robert W. Komor, in 1966 a Johnson aide and later the American Ambassador to Turkey, stated that “This is one of those tough cases where our domestic and foreign interests clash. The Turks have been harassing - always within the letter of the law - the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul in retaliation for Greek-Cypriot harassment of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. We get a small but steady stream of letters from Greek-Americans, naturally upset by these affronts...”.35

Johnson’s letter to İnönü, of course, was not motivated solely by Greek White House lobbying, the number of Greek-Americans, or the approaching Presidential elections. However, these factors evidently combined to influence the timing of the letter and probably account for its no-nonsense tone. The perseverance of Greek lobbying had its effect particularly when contrasted with the virtually inexplicable Turkish silence. With

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33 The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Ex CO 56 (box 26). The cable is datelined New York City, October 26, 1964.
34 Ibid., The letter is dated October 28, 1964.
the exception of official messages from the Turkish Embassy in Washington or from Turkish-Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük, there was scarcely any plea for the Turkish side of the Cyprus conflict at that time. True, a cable to Johnson, datelined Denver, Colorado, February 22, 1964, did arrive from the Turkish Association of Colorado, signed by its President, Halil Gerger. Later, a cable from a Turk named Hüseyin Yeltepe, from Şişli (Istanbul), and dated December 20, 1965, also arrived. However these two instances merely serve to emphasize the absence of any serious attempt by the Turks to influence the policies of President Johnson. Such an effort by the Turks was far from impossible: although there were fewer Turkish-Americans than Greek-Americans in the United States, the former numbered, nevertheless, more than a hundred thousand.

In conclusion, it may be said that, in order to be effective, lobbyists must interact with their target - in this case, the White House - frequently and on a regular basis. According to our evidence, Greek-Americans do not seem to have a regular, active lobby; rather, they act energetically, both through their associations and privately, whenever the need arises. Their public and private communications, persistent and insistent, have proven quite rewarding. The emphasis in their efforts appears, however, to be placed on an indirect, impersonal approach - mass letter and telegram campaigns - although intermediaries, such as Senators, are occasionally employed to pass their views on to the President. In this decisional setting, the pre-June 5, 1964, Greek lobbying efforts were indeed successful, particularly in the absence of any organized Turkish counter-activity.

36 Ibid., Ex CO 56 (box 26).
37 Ibid., Gen CO 56 (box 27).
38 1960 Census of Population, table 162.